The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: Return-into-libc without function calls (on x86) - Shacham 2007 Yesterday we saw that Data Execution Prevention W⊕X is one of the widely deployed defenses against code corruption attacks. Today's paper teaches us why that defense isn't as useful as it first appears! We present new techniques that … Continue reading The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: Return-into-libc without function calls (on x86)
Tag: Security
Papers relating to security, encryption, attacks and defenses.
SoK: Eternal War in Memory
SoK: Eternal War in Memory - Szekeres et al. 2013 SoK stands for 'Systematization of Knowledge' - and in this case Szekeres et al. provide a wonderful conceptual framework and overview of memory corruption attacks and the defenses against them. As you'll see, defending against these attacks is non-trivial - especially if you are concerned … Continue reading SoK: Eternal War in Memory
How to memorize a random 60-bit string
How to memorize a random 60-bit string - Ghazvininejad et al. 2105 A bit of fun for today - this paper has been the source of many articles around the net over the last couple of weeks (though not many have dug into the actual algorithms... ). Inspired by an XKCD cartoon, the challenge is … Continue reading How to memorize a random 60-bit string
A Pact with the Devil
A Pact with the Devil - Bond and Danezis, June 6th 2006 With thanks to Joshua Corman and David Etue for pointing this paper out to me during discussions at the GOTO London conference. Does that app really need all those permissions? And why can't permissions be finer-grained or temporary? For example - I'm happy … Continue reading A Pact with the Devil
Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerability of the Decade
Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerabilty of the Decade - Cowan et al. 2000 Some of you may recall reading "Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit" (hard to believe that was published in 1996!), which helped to raise consciousness of buffer overflow attacks. In this paper from 2000 Cowan et al. provide … Continue reading Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerability of the Decade
Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software
Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software - Gutmann 2002 The author of today's paper, Peter Gutmann, is the developer of CryptLib, which gives him a unique perspective both in the development of crypto, and also in how people use it (from supporting the crypolib user base). The paper was written in 2002, so … Continue reading Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software
Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices
Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices - Heninger et al. 2012 This paper definitely wins the 'best pun in a paper title' prize. P and Q here refer to the factors that are multiplied together when generating your public and private key pairs. As for the mining? It … Continue reading Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices
MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday
MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday - Kaminsky 2004 A few people have asked if I can cover more security topics in The Morning Paper. It's a subject area that always seems a little daunting to me (as in, "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing"), but it's also a subject area that I feel … Continue reading MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday
Access Rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects
Access Rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects - Centonze et al. 2015 Security in application code is a cross-cutting concern and hence very difficult to get right since the analysis often depends on non-local effects. Java and the .NET CLR both have a declarative permissions model that can grant permissions both to code, and … Continue reading Access Rights Analysis in the Presence of Subjects
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance - Castro & Liskov 1999 Oh Byzantine, you conflict me. On the one hand, we know that the old model of a security perimeter around an undefended centre is hopelessly broken (witness Google moves its Corporate Applications to the Internet)- so Byzantine models, which allow for any deviation from expected behaviour … Continue reading Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
the morning paper 