Diplomat: Using Delegations to Protect Community Repositories - Kuppusamy et al. 2016 Community repositories, such as Docker Hub, Python Package Index (PyPI), RubyGems, and SourceForge provide an easy way for a developer to disseminate software... [they] are immensely popular and collectively serve more than a billion packages per year. Unfortunately, the popularity of these repositories … Continue reading Diplomat: Using Delegations to Protect Community Repositories
Category: Security
Papers relating to security, encryption, attacks and defenses.
Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis
Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis - van den Hooff, Lazar, et al. 2015 Many users would like their communications over the Internet to be private, and for some, such as reporters, lawyers, or whistleblowers, privacy is of paramount concern... Recently, officials at the NSA have even stated that “if you have enough … Continue reading Vuvuzela: Scalable Private Messaging Resistant to Traffic Analysis
A Pact with the Devil
A Pact with the Devil - Bond and Danezis, June 6th 2006 With thanks to Joshua Corman and David Etue for pointing this paper out to me during discussions at the GOTO London conference. Does that app really need all those permissions? And why can't permissions be finer-grained or temporary? For example - I'm happy … Continue reading A Pact with the Devil
Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerability of the Decade
Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerabilty of the Decade - Cowan et al. 2000 Some of you may recall reading "Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit" (hard to believe that was published in 1996!), which helped to raise consciousness of buffer overflow attacks. In this paper from 2000 Cowan et al. provide … Continue reading Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses for the Vulnerability of the Decade
Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software
Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software - Gutmann 2002 The author of today's paper, Peter Gutmann, is the developer of CryptLib, which gives him a unique perspective both in the development of crypto, and also in how people use it (from supporting the crypolib user base). The paper was written in 2002, so … Continue reading Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software
Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices
Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices - Heninger et al. 2012 This paper definitely wins the 'best pun in a paper title' prize. P and Q here refer to the factors that are multiplied together when generating your public and private key pairs. As for the mining? It … Continue reading Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices
MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday
MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday - Kaminsky 2004 A few people have asked if I can cover more security topics in The Morning Paper. It's a subject area that always seems a little daunting to me (as in, "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing"), but it's also a subject area that I feel … Continue reading MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance - Castro & Liskov 1999 Oh Byzantine, you conflict me. On the one hand, we know that the old model of a security perimeter around an undefended centre is hopelessly broken (witness Google moves its Corporate Applications to the Internet)- so Byzantine models, which allow for any deviation from expected behaviour … Continue reading Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
From the Aether to the Ethernet – Attacking the Internet using Broadcast Digital Television
From the Aether to the Ethernet - Attacking the Internet using Broadcast Digital Television - Oren & Koremytis 2014 Before reading any further, please ensure you are in a carpeted area or other soft ground. Your jaw may hit the floor a few times when you hear what Oren & Koremytis have to tell us, … Continue reading From the Aether to the Ethernet – Attacking the Internet using Broadcast Digital Television
Bloom Cookies: web search personalization without user tracking
Bloom Cookies: Web search personalization without user tracking - Mor et al. 2015 After yesterday's homomorphic encryption-based paper it's a relief to read a privacy paper I can follow from end to end! Online services track us as much as they can get away with, in order to offer personalized services (including the 'service' of … Continue reading Bloom Cookies: web search personalization without user tracking